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Draft:  12/15/04 
Towards a Typology of Corporate Responsibility in  
Different Governance Contexts  
 
Anthony Gambino and Naomi Cahn1 
Abstract 
This paper develops a typology of different country governance contexts, in 
which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Our analysis  
measures the most appropriate methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to 
fostering corporate accountability.  Our criteria are based on several different factors, 
none of which is determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country’s 
dependence on one commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of 
the government; the state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict.  
Examining these factors together results in measuring not just the country’s receptivity to 
change, but also the means for producing change. 
At one end of the spectrum, what we label “Category 0” countries, are nations 
with economies and governments that are so poorly managed that there is little 
multinational investment – sometimes even in the context of lucrative investment 
opportunities.  At the other end lie those countries with acceptable levels of good 
governance, more developed economies and markets, and with, consequently, a 
comparatively high level of both domestic and multinational corporate investment.  We 
                                                 
1 Tony Gambino was the Mission Director for the United States Agency for International Development in 
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, from December 2001-July, 2004.  Naomi Cahn is a professor 
of law at George Washington University.  This paper was presented at the Africa Project Conference of the 
GW Institute of International Corporate Governance and Accountability, Oct. 29, 2004. 
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examine the appropriateness of strategies to apply external or internal pressure in 
different types of countries.  Next, we discuss the affects of applying the proposed 
intervention strategies to the countries, addressing both short and long-term expected 
results.  We find that in "Category 0" countries, with extremely low levels of 
international investment, strategies should focus on improving governance and overall 
human welfare, which often could lead to welcoming international corporate investment.  
Other categories of countries, with greater -- and often problematic -- international 




The country governance context is critical in deciding on appropriate strategies to 
improve corporate responsibility.  This paper develops a typology of different governance 
contexts, in which we propose four broad categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
At one end of the spectrum are countries with economies and governments that are so 
poorly managed that there is little multinational investment – sometimes even in the 
context of lucrative investment opportunities.  At the other end lie those countries with 
acceptable levels of good governance, more developed economies and markets, and with, 
consequently, a comparatively high level of both domestic and multinational corporate 
investment.  We examine the appropriateness of strategies to apply external or internal 
pressure in different types of countries.  Next, we discuss the affects of applying the 
proposed intervention strategies to the countries, addressing both short and long-term 
expected results.  The first category of countries, which includes the Democratic 
 - 3 -
Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, is, in the context of this topic, the least 
well understood; therefore, the paper discusses in greater detail the case of one of these, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “DRC”).    
 
 
Typology   
Various entities have developed different means for measuring a country’s growth and 
eligibility for investment.  The World Bank uses criteria to assess a country’s eligibility 
for IDA (International Development Assistance) that focus on per capita income and 
creditworthiness for borrowing from both commercial and multilateral institutions and 
appropriate performance standards, such as macroeconomic stability and good 
governance.2 These criteria are weighed together; for example, a country with a lower per 
capita income than the IDA cut-off may nonetheless be ineligible if it is able to secure 
commercial and other multilateral loans.3  Although the World Bank uses this 
classification for eligibility for loans, grants, and special programs of debt relief, other 
institutions also rely on these classifications.4  In sub-Saharan Africa, there are 37 
countries that qualify for IDA-status.5   
The World Economic Forum uses a growth competitiveness index based on the 
quality of the macroeconomic environment, the state of the country’s public institutions, 
                                                 
2   International Development Association, IDA Eligibility, Terms, and Graduation Policies 1-4 (2001) 
(avail. at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/ida%20eligibility.pdf). 
3   Id. at 4. 
4   Todd Moss, et al., Double-Standards, Debt Treatment, and World Bank Country Classification:  The 
Case of Nigeria 2 (2004) (avail. at http://www.cgdev.org/Publications/index.cfm?PubID=147). 
5   Id.  at 3.  Nigeria and Zimbabwe, which are not included in that number, are also IDA eligible, but they 
occupy a special “blend” status. 
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and the level of its technological readiness.6  Finally, the United States recently 
established the Millennium Challenge Account to provide development assistance to 
countries with good governance practices.  Among the 16 criteria for eligibility are civil 
liberties, control of corruption, immunization rate, inflation rate, fiscal policy, and trade 
policy.7  Among the 16 countries deemed eligible in 2004 were the following sub-
Saharan Africa nations: Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and Mozambique.8  There 
are additional measures that are more focused on governance, such as the World Bank 
Institute’s Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset, and on political and economic risk, 
such as the International Country Risk Guide.9   
While these measures are useful for background information, in our analysis, we 
are measuring a country’s suitability not just for the stability of economic investment nor 
eligibility for development assistance.  Instead, we are examining the most appropriate 
methods for helping to create a climate that is receptive to fostering corporate 
accountability, a complex analysis that includes legal, social, economic, and political 
variables.  Our criteria are based on several different factors, none of which is 
determinative: the natural resources of the country; the country’s dependence on one 
commodity; the corruption level; the stability and accountability of the government; the 
state of civil society; and the existence of ongoing conflict.  Examining these factors 
together results in measuring not just the country’s receptivity to change, but also the 
means for producing change. 
                                                 
6 World Economic Forum, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, Exec. Summary, in Africa Competitiveness Report 1, 
3 (2004), avail. at www.weforum.org/pdf/Glob.pdf.   
7 Millennium Challenge Corporation:  Reducing Poverty Through Growth, avail. At 
www.mca.gov/countries/selection/data/shtml. 
8 Eligible Countries, avail. at http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligible/index.shtml. 
9   Moss, supra note __, at 12. 
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We have divided countries in sub-Saharan Africa into four different categories.10 
We call the first category of countries “Category 0,” to denote the near-absence of both 
effective governance and significant levels of foreign investment.   These countries, such 
as Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, have long had weak, highly corrupt 
governments, typically have suffered recently from war, and are left today with very low 
levels of international investment.   Category 0 countries possess extremely ineffective 
basic institutions in the areas necessary to establish the prerequisites for corporate 
controls of any kind; they lack a reliable legal system, governmental transparency, and 
functioning capital markets.11  The law as written and the law as enforced in the courts 
differ dramatically.12   Ironically, many of these countries are resource-rich, but they do 
not perform as well as some resource-poor countries when it comes to economic, social, 
and governance issues.13   A recent Global Witness report notes:  “Instability, coupled 
with widespread corruption throughout the DRC, is currently a major deterrent to foreign 
investment . . .  Understandably, many mining companies are unwilling to take the risks 
involved in starting operations in the DRC.”14  As a result, notwithstanding the many 
opportunities for business investment, there is little external capital, and indigenous 
businesses remain relatively small. 
                                                 
10   Although our analysis focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, the categories can be used more globally as well. 
 11. Id. at 848. The last sentence of the article concludes “[t]hese countries need honest judges and regulators, good disclosure 
rules, and the beginnings of a culture of honesty before it makes sense to worry” about other corporate governance issues, such as the 
number of independent directors. Id. at 849.  
 12. This is certainly true in the Congo. Stuart Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in 
Uganda, 48 J. Leg. Educ. 101, 104 (1998). In preparing to teach a course on securities markets in Uganda, Professor Cohn discovered 
that “[n]othing existed except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority that had no capital markets to regulate, and a stock exchange 
devoid of stock.” Id. at 104. His advice to other teachers developing similar courses is not to assume that their students know the law. 
In Uganda, for example, copies of relevant statutes were simply not available in the numbers necessary for teaching in the classroom. 
Id. at 108.  
 13. Id. at 1. 
14   Global Witness at 8. 
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The second category, “Category One,” denotes countries highly dependent on a 
single source of export revenue, often oil.  Single-source resource dependence provides 
increased opportunities for corruption, and oil and mineral exports can have an anti-
democratic impact.15    These countries have substantial investments, but in very focused 
areas.   Category 1 countries, such as Angola, Botswana, Nigeria, and the Republic of 
Congo (hereafter “Congo-Brazzaville”), depend overwhelmingly on one major 
commodity for their export revenue.  Large multinational corporations have risked 
substantial amounts of capital in these countries.  The commodity may be oil as is true of 
Nigeria, Angola, and Congo-Brazzaville16, or, as in the case of Botswana, diamonds.  
Aside from Botswana, these countries trend strongly in the direction of corrupt and 
highly inefficient governments, but are marginally more stable than Category 0 countries.  
Countries that are rich in natural resources provide potentially lucrative 
opportunities for private investors and can contribute to a country’s fiscal strength.17 
Ironically, many of the most resource-rich countries actually do not perform as well as 
resource-poor countries when it comes to economic, social, and governance issues; this is 
the so-called “paradox of plenty.”18 Countries that are highly dependent on natural 
resource wealth tend to have slower growth rates than other countries.19 Resource 
dependence provides increased opportunities for corruption, and oil and mineral exports 
(although not others) have an anti-democratic impact.20 
                                                 
 15. Id. at 8. 
16 In 2001, the latest year for which data are available, the two largest oil exporters in sub-Saharan Africa 
were Nigeria, which  exported 107,176,000 metric tons, and Angola, which exported 35,089,000 metric 
tons;  Congo-Brazzaville was the fourth largest exporter, at 12,550 tons.  World Bank, African 
Development Indicators 2004 90 (2004). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 1. 
 19. Pegg, supra n. 32, at 8, 12, 13. 
 20. Id. at 8. 
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This “resource curse,” in which governments are highly dependent on natural 
resources, can have a significantly negative impact on governments by: (1) fostering 
corruption, as governments receive large amounts of resource revenues; (2) weakening 
governments, such as through loss of control over resource-rich territories; and 
(3) diminishing accountability, such as governmental use of resource revenues to 
cultivate patronage and large security forces.21 
Encouraging private sector development and implementing extensive aid 
programs do not necessarily result in better governmental accountability, although good 
governance is critical for business development and increasing per capita income.22 The 
relationship, however, is not rigid; for example, Botswana, which is the largest diamond 
exporter in the world and has experienced the highest rate of growth in the world for 
twenty of the past thirty-five years, holds elections every five years and has the highest 
level of transparency of payments of any country in Africa.23 
  Our third category encompasses the “Category 2” countries.  Examples are 
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda.  These countries are not as poor as the 
countries in Category 0, and have a broader range of export commodities than the 
countries in Category 1.    These countries are characterized by substantial levels of 
external investment (when compared to Category 0), and, broadly speaking, governments 
that are more interested in decreasing corruption and improving the business 
environment. 
                                                 
 21. Michael Ross, The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor, in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: 
Options and Actions 17, 24–25 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Bank 2003). And they can also finance rebel movements. See 
Winer & Roule, supra n. 70, at 200–202 (discussing how various outside armies in the Congo financed themselves through plundered 
resources); U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 59.  
 22. See Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 19 (in countries with “high levels of transparency, effective parliamentary oversight, and high 
standards of corporate ethics, there was a higher rate of GDP growth over the previous three years than in countries with lower 
standards of transparency, of parliamentary oversight, and corporate ethics”). Other developmental outcomes, such as the literacy rate 
and infant mortality, are also positively affected. Id. at 17. 
 23. Save the Children, Lifting the Resource Curse: Extractive Industry, Children, and Governance 13, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/scf-drc-17jun.pdf (accessed Dec. 20, 2003). 
 - 8 -
Category 3, the final category, includes the best-run countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as South Africa, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal.  In these countries, country 
governance is much improved and orders of magnitude better than in Category 0 
countries, economies are diversified, and levels of foreign investment are already 
reasonably high.  South Africa, for example, had the highest amount of manufacturing 
exports in sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual growth rate of 7-8%.24 
 
Corporate Accountability and Good Governance 
The central implications of the typology are that countries in different categories 
require different strategies relating to corporate responsibility.  A deeper implication is 
that the entire strategic approach to corporate responsibility requires unpacking.  For 
example, it is hard to enhance corporate responsibility in countries with no multinational 
corporations!  Should those countries in Category 0, then, be put in a category labeled 
“hopeless”?  How can you have corporate accountability and responsibility in a situation 
where there are few corporations and very weak governance?  Is the relationship between 
corporations and good governance really as insidious as some still assume?   
 We believe it is a bias to assume that increased international investment by 
corporations is in and of itself a bad thing for the country or that corporations prefer poor 
governance.  In the context of Category 0 countries, these statements are patently untrue.  
The existence of a substantial multinational presence could provide the impetus for 
change.  On the other hand, outside of a few countries where extractive industries provide 
such great rewards that they justify the risks (as seen in many category 1 countries), 
widespread corruption and inefficient government serve as a disincentive to foreign 
                                                 
24   Africa Development Indicators, supra note __, at 104-105. 
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investment.25 When corporations cannot rely on enforcement of contracts, cannot rely on 
public bureaucracies, cannot hire literate workers, then they are much less likely to invest 
in a country. 
 There has been a great deal of publicity and activism around issues of “economic 
globalization,”  a phenomenon which Jagdish Bhagwati thoughtfully describes as 
“integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct 
foreign investment . . . short-term capital flows, international flows of worker and 
humanity generally, and flows of technology.”26  Economic globalization is accused of 
benefiting multinational corporations over local workers, and increasing the wealth of 
foreign investors at the expense of country-internal workers and businesses.27  In a 
thoughtful paper, Todd Moss and his colleagues discuss the historical antipathy towards 
foreign investment in Africa, and debunk many of the myths.28 While we too recognize 
the dangers of globalization, we also believe that foreign investment can improve a 
country’s economic, political, and social outlook.   
Indeed, it is only within the past decade that international economists have begun 
to study the relationship between good governance and a good business environment.29  
New research shows that good governance results in improved development, but that 
increasing incomes does not, by itself, result in good governance.30 
                                                 
25   See, e.g., infra; Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an Internal Policy Problem:  Overview and 
Recommendations 175, 194, in Corruption and the Global Economy (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed. 1997), 
26 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 3 (2004). 
27   See, e.g., The International Forum on Globalization, avail. at http://www.ifg.org/about.htm. 
28 Todd J. Moss, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Manju Kedia Shah, Is Africa’s Skepticism of Foreign Capital 
Justified?  Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data  (2004)(avail. at 
www.cgdev.org/Publications/?PubID=120. 
 29. Kaufmann & Kraay, supra n. 46, at 73–75. 
 30. Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 17. 
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In an exhaustive survey of the relationship between governance and corruption, 
World Bank economists used six concepts to measure good governance, including 
governmental accountability, political stability, and the quality of government service 
delivery, consisting of policy making, the rule of law, and corruption control.31 The Bank 
economists found a correlation between good governance and per capita income, but they 
also discovered that a higher per capita income does not necessarily result in better 
country governance.32  On the other hand, good governance is critical to fostering 
sustainable development.33  When executives were asked to list the most important 
constraints on their firms’ growth, corruption and ineffective government bureaucracies 
were second and third on the list, with only a lack of finance rated as a larger constraint.34   
Strategies 
Broadly, there are two sets of interrelated strategies that can be used to change the 
investment climates to improve governance and improve the climate for international 
investment.  First, multilateral institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and international 
nongovernmental organizations can exert pressure on the national government and other 
institutions within a country where they have programs.   Second, indigenous non-
governmental organizations, individuals, and responsible governmental officials can 
pressure institutions from within the country (often with external support).    
                                                 
 31. Id. at 5; Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 3–4, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf (Dec. 20, 2003). 
 32. Kaufmann, supra n. 44, at 17. 
 33. World Bank Group, Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development: A Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience vol. 
2, 51, http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ wds_Ibank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_20030828164541; select PDF (July 
29, 2003) (stating that the bank should focus on strengthening governance prior to expansion). 
 34. Michaela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, 18 (Harper Collins 2001). This data is drawn from the Executive Opinion 
Survey of the World Economic Forum. Id. at 8. The African countries surveyed were: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe. Many of the countries with high levels of corruption, such as the DRC, were not even included in the survey. 
Id.  
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There have been four types of efforts to foster corporate responsibility via the 
actions of external actors.35  First, there has been legislation specifically directed at 
promoting responsibility, including disclosure requirements.  For example, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in the United States was enacted to deter US companies from 
bribing foreign officials.  Second, corporations have adopted voluntary codes of 
responsibility.36  These codes may have been developed internally by multilateral 
corporations, by industry-based organizations, or by multi-governmental entities, such as 
the OECD.  Third, as local and international nongovernmental organizations have exerted 
more pressure, companies have directly engaged with consumers and NGOs through 
meetings, publicity campaigns, or other types of actions.37   Finally, government aid 
agencies and multilateral institutions, like the World Bank, have pressured companies 
and countries to develop improved accountability.   
The most visible efforts have come through this third type of activism.  For 
example, a group of nongovernmental organizations have launched an initiative, which 
has received increasing amounts of attention, to use transparency through the reporting of 
resource revenues to hold both the corporation as an entity and the government 
accountable for money paid and received.38  The “Publish What You Pay” campaign, 
which was officially launched in June of 2002, pushes corporations to disclose all 
payments made to governments.39  Publish What You Pay would lead to the release of 
information about how much governments are receiving from companies, thereby 
                                                 
 35. Id.  
36  These codes are discussed by others at the conference.  See the papers by McInerney and Murphy. 
 37. Le Billon, supra n. 3, at 264. 
 38. Global Witness, Publish What You Pay: An Appeal for Social Responsibility through Financial Transparency Headed by 
George Loros and a Coalition and a Coalition of NGOs, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/oil/publish_what_pay.php 
(accessed Feb. 13, 2004). 
 39. For further description of the campaign see Global Witness, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org (accessed Feb. 13, 2004); 
Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org (accessed Feb. 13, 2004). 
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permitting citizens, corporations, and NGOs to monitor how that money is being spent.40  
The campaign is directed at companies, their home governments, and the exporting 
countries; the types of payments requiring disclosure would include taxes, fees, royalties, 
signing bonuses, and any other money transferred to the federal, state, or local 
governments.41   The theory behind this strategy is that, to trace what happens to money 
paid to government officials, it is useful to have some idea of how much money they are 
actually receiving.42  Improved transparency should help the business environment 
improve as companies recognize that government benefits are no longer arbitrarily 
granted, and the risks and costs of doing business decrease.43   
These non-governmental organization efforts have dovetailed with the first two 
sets of reforms (developed country legislation and voluntary codes) because there are a 
variety of initiatives that already exist to promote host-country and company reporting, 
ranging from an IMF voluntary Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency to OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.44 The means for enforcing these obligations 
have, so far, been voluntary.45  These efforts are important in all categories except 
Category 0. 
Finally, the World Bank has imposed conditions on its funding of various 
business projects in order to encourage transparency, and has attempted to provide 
                                                 
 40. Simon Taylor, Corporate Secrecy Oils the Wheels of Poverty, Intl. Herald Trib. (June 20, 2002). 
 41. Gary & Karl, supra n. 36, at 79; Global Witness, http://publishwhatyoupay.org/ appeal (accessed Feb. 13, 2004). 
 42. See id. (explaining the theory behind mandatory disclosure). 
 43. Id.; e.g. Dept. for Intl. Dev., Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_guide_a.htm (accessed Feb. 13, 2004); Dept. for Intl. Dev., Report of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Workshop, 11–12 (Feb. 2003), 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_workshop_report_feb03.pdf (accessed Feb. 13, 2004). 
 44. Philip Swanson et al., Who Gets the Money? Reporting Resource Revenues in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: 
Options and Actions, 43, 58–75 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Bank 2003).  
 45. Le Billon, supra n. 3, at 257–258; Swanson, supra n. 149, at 62, 79. In its preliminary review of the Angolan diamond 
certification process, the NGO Global Witness suggests the necessity of independent monitoring performed by an unaffiliated entity to 
protect the integrity of any control system. Global Witness, Can Controls Work? A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System?, 
http://www.globalwitness.org; select diamonds, select briefing documents, select English version ‘can controls work’ (Dec. 26, 2001). 
See also Gereffi et al., supra n. 6, at 60 (pointing out that control systems vary in strength depending on whether they are sponsored by 
industry, NGOs, or multilaterals). 
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follow-up monitoring throughout the duration of its projects.46    These outside control 
efforts are important, and work should be done to make sure that the laws as they stand 
are enforced, and that greater openness is supported.  
To sustain the corporate responsibility agenda, however, local communities must 
feel vested in the process.  As the World Bank points out, only when “public sector actors 
and stakeholders based in developing countries are accorded a central role” can “an 
agenda that remains largely ‘foreign’” become domestic.47  The most critical reforms are 
those that increase political participation and accountability and promote competitive 
economic develop, but such democratization and economic development do not occur 
quickly.48  
Category 0 
Multinational corporations do not want to work in Category 0 countries.  In a 
recent study of 107 multinational companies with total revenues of $1.66 trillion, 
respondents were asked about the impact of corporate social responsibility on their 
investment decisions.49  A majority of the respondents noted that the influence of 
corporate social responsibility considerations had increased over the past five years, and 
that such concerns had at least as much impact as more traditional considerations – such 
as cost – on the decision to undertake new business opportunities. 50  Moreover, a 
majority of the extractive industry (mining and oil and gas companies) respondents 
reported that they had decided not to begin operations in a new country based on such 
                                                 
 46. U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 66, at 18. 
47 Halina Ward, Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility:  Taking Stock  25 
(2004)(World Bank). 
48   See Elliott, supra note __, at 209, 225. 
49 Jonathan E. Berman and Tobias Webb, Race to the Top:  Attracting and Enabling Global Sustainable 
Business:  Business Survey Report (2003)(World Bank website). 
50  Id. At 3. 
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concerns.51  Rather than looking for opportunities in countries where laws on corporate 
social responsibility were weak, 61% of the companies reported that strong laws made it 
easier for them to conduct business, and 75% indicated that well-enforced laws also 
helped their business.52  Another author notes:  "In countries with weak development, it is 
costly [for firms] to improve investor protection because the institutional infrastructure is 
lacking and good governance has political costs.  Further, in such countries, the benefit 
from improving governance is weaker because capital markets lack depth." 53  
We believe that even in Category 0 countries there are realistic strategies with 
positive short-term results leading to improved governance and an improved climate for 
international investment.  The key issue, clarified by the typology, is that indigenous 
actors in Category 0 countries are in desperate need of outside assistance to overcome the 
manifold obstacles in their way.  Marshalling sophisticated strategies to link outside and 
inside actors to improve governance is a critically needed intervention, particularly in 
Category 0 countries. 
 The Case of the Congo:  Today, the DRC, a clear example of a Category 0 
country, is emerging from a long war.54  The illegal exploitation of the Congo’s natural 
resources, including gold, diamonds,55 coltan, cobalt, and timber, helped fuel the war.56 
There were virtually no barriers to money-laundering.57  Indeed, the abuses of natural 
resources were so egregious that the United Nations issued a special report 
                                                 
51   Id. At 3, 8. 
52   Id. At 19. 
53   Craig Doidge, et al., Why Do Countries Matter so Much for Corporate Governance? (Sept. 2004)(avail. 
at www.edgi.org/wp). 
 54. See Bergner, supra n. 57 (stating that U.N. “accords have lately brought a tenuous degree of peace”). Although labeled a civil 
war, some have labeled the Congolese conflict as the first World War in Africa because of the many neighboring countries which 
fought battles on Congolese territory. Marc Laceu, Hope Glimmers as War Retreats from Congo, N.Y. Times A1 (Oct. 21, 2003). 
 55. U.N. Sec. Council, supra n. 66, at 14–15, 44–46. 
 56. Jonathan M. Winer & Trifin J. Roule, Follow the Money: The Finance of Illicit Resource Extraction, in Natural Resources 
and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., World Book 2003). 
 57. Id. at 202. 
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recommending that twenty-nine companies be subjected to financial restrictions, 
including a freezing of assets and a suspension of banking activities.58 
Amnesty International published an analysis of mining in southern Congo in its 
Fall 2004 magazine.   The article paints an accurate, devastating picture of the artisanal 
activity that characterizes most mining in the DRC today:  “(T)housands of desperate 
locals … are digging the radioactive ground for minerals, including cobalt and gold.  
With picks and shovels in short supply, some of the Shinkolobwe miners have 
improvised, tearing down the metal signs warning of radioactive danger and shaping 
them into shovels. … The going rate for the miners is about 1,000 Congolese francs 
(about $3) for a 35-pound sack of raw ore.”  These miners make a pittance, yet, as 
Amnesty reports, a 20-ton truckload “of raw ore fetches about $25,000 on world 
markets.”  Profits only go up from there.  Perhaps the cell phone you are carrying 
contains both coltan and cobalt, mined in this fashion in the Congo, and contributing to 
very nice profits for various international companies. 
Yet Amnesty offers the following analysis in an accompanying box entitled “AI 
(Amnesty International) Fights Resource Exploitation”:  “International efforts to 
investigate and end this bloody commerce have been slow and mostly unsuccessful to 
date, due to opposition by the governments and corporations implicated in abuses.”  And 
then makes the following recommendation for advocacy:  “AI continues to call on 
governments in Africa and Europe, as well as the United States, to act on U.N. reports 
listing corporations engaged in the illegal exploitation of resources and activities that may 
contribute to human rights abuses.” 
                                                 
 58. U.N. Sec. Council; supra n. 66, at http://www.un.org/docs/journal/asp/ws/asp?m=s/ 2002/1146. 
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This approach is misleading for the general reader.  Amnesty’s recommendations 
relate to other mining activities in regions of the Congo hundreds of miles away from the 
mine they discuss in their article.  Advocating such actions against the mining activities 
actually described in the Amnesty article would be misguided.  There are no major 
multinational mining companies presently engaged in mining in the southern Congo 
province of Katanga.  The entry of major multinational mining companies in all 
likelihood would lead to substantial improvements in living conditions, in transparency, 
and in economic development.  International advocacy should urge governments in 
Category 0 to improve their transparency and other practices to hasten the investment of 
multinationals, not the reverse. 
In another recent report on the mineral trade in copper and cobalt in the DRC, 
Global Witness documents the conditions under which these minerals are collected in the 
southernmost region of the Congo amid widespread corruption and mismanagement.59  
For example, under the new Mining Code, companies are required to pay a 1% tax; one 
company reported that it was asked to pay this so often that it became a 40% tax.60  
Accordingly, Global Witness has developed a series of recommendations issued to the 
World Bank and IMF as well as the DRC transitional government that focus on 
improving record-keeping and “commit[ting] to making anti-corruption, transparency and 
accountability priority areas by publishing the results of systems and finance audits.”61   
Such transparency is, of course, critical.   Nonetheless, without continuing 
internal pressure and oversight, these recommendations are insufficient.  Focusing on 
                                                 
59 Global Witness:  Rush and Ruin:  The Devastating Mineral Trade in Southern Katanga, DRC 
(2004)(avail. At globalwitness.org). 
60  Id. At 16. 
61  Id. At 2. 
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what international institutions and national governments can do overlooks the need for 
local monitoring and involvement.   
There are other examples of looking for “quick fix” recommendations.  This 
temptation often leads people examining the problems of Category 0 (and other) 
countries to suggest that broad internal reforms, such as elections, strengthening the 
judiciary, or standing up an anti-corruption commission, by themselves will lead to 
marked improvements in governance.  For example, President Bush in his fall 2004 
address to the United Nations General Assembly said the following:  "Because I believe 
the advance of liberty is the path to both a safer and better world, today I propose 
establishing a Democracy Fund within the United Nations.  This is a great calling for this 
great organization.  The fund would help countries lay the foundations of democracy by 
instituting the rule of law and independent courts, a free press, political parties and trade 
unions.  Money from the fund would also help set up voter precincts and polling places, 
and support the work of election monitors.  To show our commitment to the new 
Democracy Fund, the United States will make an initial contribution.”62   
The record suggests that “advancing liberty,” and other worthy goals, is a much 
more difficult undertaking.  The proposed interventions are not bad, they are insufficient.   
Certain actions, such as reforming the judiciary, in countries like the DRC are long-term 
and extremely difficult.  Furthermore, implementing these long-term reforms depends on 
a well-paid civil service, and these essential longer-term strategies will fail if civil 
servants are not paid enough.  Category 0 countries need additional investment.  
                                                 
62 For Bush, ‘the Advance of Liberty is the Path,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2004, at A4.   
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For Category 0, attacks on multinationals tend to miss the point.  As we have 
already noted, these companies, in the main, are not even present in countries like the 
DRC.  We will return to this issue at the conclusion of this paper. 
 
Category 1 
For Category 1 countries, effective tools have been developed by multilateral 
institutions, corporations themselves, other governments with important relations with 
Category 1 countries, and international nongovernmental organizations to pressure both 
the governments and the corporations themselves to act more responsibly.63  This is 
where the multilateral institutions, NGOs, and other international actors can play a role.64  
There is, of course, a perceived, and often real, conflict of interest between the objectives 
of multinationals, their host and home governments, the multilaterals, the communities, 
and the NGOs. Each has its own goals, and in many sub-Saharan African governments 
individuals working in the public sector have their own selfish interests in receiving 
payments outside of the official system.  
Unlike Category 0 countries, where we believe combined local and international 
strategies must be intertwined to gain improvements in basic country governance, in 
Category 1 and beyond a variety of more loosely linked strategies, including work to 
improve corporate governance, can be effectively employed.  As the ongoing oil bribery 
investigations in Nigeria illustrate, external legislation, such as the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, may at least punish irresponsible corporate actions, even if it does not 
                                                 
 63. Le Billon, supra n. 3. 
 64. This is not to overlook the role that such institutions play in countries with effective governments and low rates of 
corruption; however, there is literature addressing these issues already. Supra n. 9. 
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entirely deter such actions.65 We do not, however, believe that external actors and actions 
should ever be delinked from the realities of the targeted country and society.  People 
within the country must always be part of any process that looks to enhance governance 
and corporate responsibility. 
Categories 2 and 3 
Category 2 and 3 countries should benefit from approaches similar to those in 
Category 1.  But given the diversity of corporate involvement and overall level of 
development, particularly of some countries in Category 3, broader approaches may be 
more effective.  Both external and internal pressure on corporations doing business in 
these countries is likely to result in the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct.  Category 
3 countries have themselves undertaken to enact legislation to deter corruption, and have 
provided enforcement mechanisms.66  New mechanisms, such as the MCA, may 
encourage improved governance and increased transparency. 
In these countries, internal institutional reforms can continue their positive 
trajectory to promote competition and deter corruption.  Such strategies include 
reforming the judiciary to ensure independence; increasing incentives for honesty and 
transparency in the civil service; use of competitive bidding schemes in government 
procurement; and strengthening already existing civil society institutions, such as the 
media and non-governmental organizations.67 
                                                 
65 E.g., Ken Silverstein, Investigation Widens in Nigeria Oil Case Involving Halliburton, L.A> Times, Oct. 
13, 2004, A6 (scheme to bribe Nigerian officials for contract to construct natural gas complex); Justin 
Blum, U.S. Oil Firms Entwined In Equatorial Guinea Deals; Riggs Probe Led to SEC Inquiry 
onCorruption, Profiteering, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 2004, E1. 
Riggs Probe Led to SEC Inquiry on Corruption, Profiteering 
66  South Africa has, for example, enacted its own anti-corruption act modeled on the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  South Africa:  Tough Legislation Puts Firms in the Dock, Africa News, July 16, 2004. 
67   See Elliott, supra note __, at 225. 
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Long-term Strategies 
There are certain things that can be done relatively quickly, such as what Michael 
Brown and his colleagues from Innovative Resources Management describe in their 
paper discussing the DRC,68 in a Category 0 country.  These actions involve focusing on 
local stakeholders so that they can take ownership and control of the agenda.   
Longer-term actions are also required, particularly in Category 0 and 1 countries, 
which are the predicate conditions for beginning a conversation about corporate 
accountability.  Perhaps the most essential actions are those to improve education, 
increase literacy rates, and develop an adequately-paid and trained, appropriately-sized 
civil service sector.  A literate population will not only provide pressure for increased 
democratization, by enhancing people’s skills, it better equips them to choose among a 
much greater range of employment possibilities.  Concomitantly, as a workforce becomes 
more skilled and literacy levels rise, international business sees greater opportunities for 
investment.69   Furthermore, a population that is able to read can take steps required to 
insist on improved governance practices.  If people are literate, then they will have access 
to other resources and can look outside of their traditional worldviews – if they read a 
newspaper, they may be able to see what can be done differently.  When taking steps to 
increase literacy, it is critical to ensure gender equity.  Studies have repeatedly shown that 
educated women have fewer children and allocate more money to benefit their children 
                                                 
68 Michael Brown, et al., Combating Low-level Corruption on Waterways in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: Approaches from Bandundu and Equateur Provinces, avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=627684. 
69 Topic  Brief (avail. at http://www1.worldbank.org/education/topicbrief.asp) 
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than do similarly educated men.  Moreover, educating more women increases economic 
growth and generates more skilled workers.70  
As an example of how increasing literacy can reduce corruption, consider the 
status of education in Uganda.  In a survey examining the use of public funds in 
education in Uganda, researchers found that between 1991 and 1995 only 13 percent of 
the federal government’s allocation for non-wage expenditures actually reached the 
schools. Instead, most of the money was being diverted to local government officials (and 
other politicians).  After the survey information was disseminated publicly, the 
government instituted a series of reforms, including publishing the monthly grants to 
each primary school in newspapers for all to see and posting school grants awards on the 
school wall. Because of the increased information, parents were better able to monitor 
how local officials used public funds.71  As a result, the amount of leakage diminished 
substantially:  by 1999, over 80 percent of allocated fund reached the schools.72  The 
study concluded that information dissemination is important in reducing corruption.73  
This, of course, is the concept of transparency.  It works best when there is a literate 
population.    
Transparency works as a sealant against the corrosiveness of corruption.  
Corruption takes a series of different forms, including bribes to obtain government 
services (corruption in administration), as well as corruption in the process of 
                                                 
70 Dina Abu-Ghaida and Stephen Klausen, The Economic and Human Development Costs of Missing the Millennium 
Development Goal on Gender Equity 10 (2004)(avail. at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/education/pdf/MDG_Gender_Equity.pdf). 
71 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, The Power of Information:  Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign 
to Reduce Capture (2004)(avail. at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=34028 
72 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, Explaining Leakage of Public Funds (2001)(avail. at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=2595). 
73   Explaining Leakage, supra note __,  at 29. 
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promulgating rules (corruption in law-making).74 Although corruption in law-making is 
significant in preventing change in a country’s governance structure and in maintaining 
the dominance of the existing elite, bribing government officials to obtain precious 
government access is the largest area of corruption in developing countries.75 Because 
businesses need access to obtain export permits or business licenses, they may feel 
coerced into bribing the appropriate official.76 Additionally, in many developing 
countries where civil service positions are poorly (if at all) compensated jobs, 
government employees may feel justified in accepting bribes for their services.77 While 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Convention, together with other programs, attempt to prevent 
corruption and bribery,78 they are not effective in many countries.79   
 Civil servants also must receive adequate salaries on time.  Particularly in 
Category 0, 1, and 2 countries, poorly-trained, ill-paid, unmotivated civil servants stuck 
in an inefficient, overstuffed public sector impede efforts towards improved governance.  
Efforts around the margins in countries where this overriding problem is not addressed 
are destined to be ineffective.  Building a civil service system based on impartiality and 
transparency, where public employees depend on the state rather than the illegal 
                                                 
 74. See Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Growth Without Governance, 3 Economia 169 (Fall 2002), 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/growthgov.htm (accessed Jan. 2, 2004); Joel Hellman et al., Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/measure.pdf (Apr. 2000) (identifying state capture as a significant issue to be 
confronted by transitional economies). Kaufmann and Kraay found that firms that engage in this form of illicit influence did in fact 
experience higher growth rates than firms that did not engage in this form of influence.. Id.; A third form of corruption is “influence,” 
which, like state capture, allows private individuals to help shape public laws. Amanda J. Pery, The Relationship between Legal 
Systems and Economic Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural Approaches, 29 J.L. & Socy. 282, 306 (2002). Influence 
depends on the size of the firm and interactions with state officials, rather than direct payments. Id.  
 75. Saladin Al-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on Development, 9 Transnatl. L. & Contemporary 
Problems 193, 198–199 (1999). 
 76. Id. at 199. 
 77. Id. Al-Jurf lists other circumstances that are conducive to bribery, including the amount of discretion that civil servants are 
able to exercise, a legal system that fails to punish bribery, and private companies that are willing to pay the costs of doing business. 
Id. at 199-200. 
 78. Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: The Role of Corporate Action within a 
Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 471, 472–473 (2001). 
 79. Id. at 472 (noting that the same circumstances that apply to the FCPA apply to the OECD convention, namely the 
questionable effectiveness of a western legal theory in non-western countries). 
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payments of private companies for their salaries, creates a better business environment 
and provides reassurance to civil society actors.   
 
Conclusion 
Actions to improve good governance can be taken in all categories of countries.  
But actions to improve corporate responsibility are poorly targeted when focused on 
Category 0 countries.  Our proposed typology leads us to suggest that Category 0 
countries require a radically different approach than those in Category 1.  People 
interested in more justice and improvements in human well-being through improved 
corporate governance, should focus on the approaches discussed above in Category 0 
countries.  When successful, these approaches will lead to greater involvement of 
international business, which should be a positive development, under the scenario 
outlined in this paper.   
More traditional approaches, such as external pressure through a variety of means 
on multinational businesses, can have a positive effect in Category 1-3 countries.  
Category 1 countries seem the most ripe for targeted efforts by international actors to 
obtain improvements in local conditions through enhanced multinational corporate 
responsibility.  While Categories 2 and 3 will also improve through such efforts, and the 
pressure must be sustained, they are already, in general, far more receptive to both 
domestic and international efforts to promote corporate accountability, and such efforts 
have already begun to yield encouraging results. 
